A lower bound on effective performance testing for digital forensic tools by Pan, Lei & Batten, Lynn
Deakin Research Online 
 
This is the published version:  
 
Pan, Lei and Batten, Lynn 2007, A lower bound on effective performance testing for digital 
forensic tools, in SADFE 2007: Second International Workshop on Systematic Approaches to 
Digital Forensic Engineering: proceedings: 10-12 April 2007, Seattle, Washington, USA, 
IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos, Calif., pp. 117-130. 
 
Available from Deakin Research Online: 
 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30008107  
                                                                                   
                            
Reproduced with the kind permission of the copyright owner.  
 
Copyright: 2007, IEEE Computer Society. 
A Lower Bound on Effective Performance Testing for Digital
Forensic Tools
Lei Pan Lynn M. Batten
School of Engineering and Information Technology,
Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia
E-mail: {ln,lmbatten}@deakin.edu.au
Abstract
The increasing complexity and number of digital forensic tasks required in criminal inves-
tigations demand the development of an effective and efficient testing methodology, enabling
tools of similar functionalities to be compared based on their performance. Assuming that
the tool tester is familiar with the underlying testing platform and has the ability to use
the tools correctly, we provide a numerical solution for the lower bound on the number of
testing cases needed to determine comparative capabilities of any set of digital forensic tools.
We also present a case study on the performance testing of password cracking tools, which
allows us to confirm that the lower bound on the number of testing runs needed is closely
related to the row size of certain orthogonal arrays. We show how to reduce the number of
test runs by using knowledge of the underlying system.
Index Terms: Abstraction Layer Model, Orthogonal Arrays, Partition Testing, SADFE,
Software Performance.
1 Introduction
With the increase of the storage volume on a home computer from a couple of Gigabytes
to a few hundred Gigabytes in the last several years, and the introduction of anti-forensic
tools freely available on the market [1], the workload for the digital forensic investigator
has increased drastically in a short time. It is therefore necessary to introduce an effective
and efficient testing methodology to help identify those tools which have best performance.
A recent testing case [2] has revealed that a widely used disk imaging tool, referred
to as dd, copies an incomplete number of disk sectors under the Linux 2.4 kernel. This
result indicates that ignoring the underlying computer system in assessing tools may lead
to incorrect conclusions. Because software programs are high-level applications which rely
on the underlying computer system to produce correct and instantaneous results, we argue
that it is important to consider the underlying computer system performance alongside
that of the forensic tool.
We will use the common approach of measuring performance based on the execution
time [3] of a digital forensic tool installed on a computer system, and henceforth refer to
the conjunction of the tool and computer as a “system”. Thus, the less time it takes to
finish a task, the better the performance of the system.
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We require fairness and blindness of the testing process; that is, every tool and every
system value should be considered equally, and no performance conclusion should be drawn
before the end of the entire testing process. The fairness requirement prevents the setting
up of a biased testing situation — each parameter is considered in every testing run and
their values will appear an equal number of times; the blindness requirement prevents any
advantage gained by deliberately aborting the testing cases.
Due to the fact that most design specifications of digital forensic tools are not publicly
available, we assume that the tool tester knows how to use the tools and uses them correctly
during the testing phase. Secondly, we assume that the tester has a clear understanding of
the formats of inputting and outputting data for each forensic tool to be tested. Finally, we
assume that the tester is capable of tuning the underlying computer system by replacing
hardware components or adjusting system settings.
In this paper, we cite the existing research results that partition testing [4-7] is the best
method of performance testing and that, used in conjunction with orthogonal arrays [8, 9],
is the best method for satisfying our requirements and assumptions in the digital forensic
context. Furthermore, by examining the existence of orthogonal arrays of certain sizes, we
are able to derive a general lower bound on the number of testing cases needed. We also
present a case study where the testing runs are reduced before they are tested by using the
well-known Taguchi method [10-12].
The focus of this paper is to derive the numerical lower bound of testing cases where all
the testing parameters are given. We show that this problem is equivalent to deriving the
exact size of orthogonal arrays, which is in turn proportional to the experimental cost. We
also illustrate how to normalize the parameters in a system to reduce the number of testing
runs, a point often missed in the experimental literature.
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we give the required background on
partition testing and orthogonal arrays and explain why they are suitable for our purpose.
In section 3, we numerically derive lower bounds for the partition testing cases using or-
thogonal arrays and discuss the possibilities of reducing the testing complexity. In section
4, we present a performance testing example to illustrate our methodology. We conclude
in section 5.
2 Partition Testing And Orthogonal Arrays
2.1 Partition Testing vs. Random Testing
Partition testing, in which a tester divides a system’s input domain according to some
rule and then tests within the subdomains, is a common software testing approach [4-7].
On the other hand, random testing, in which a tester randomly tests the system’s input
domain, is also widely used in software testing [14]. So which approach best meets the
fairness and blindness requirements?
Duran and Ntafos [13] showed that random testing can be as effective as partition testing,
under very restrictive conditions; Hamlet and Taylor later in [16] found Duran and Ntafos’s
conditions are rarely met in real testing cases; Gutjahr [7] followed Hamlet and Taylor’s
work and theoretically proved that “partition testing compares more favorably to random
testing” when no assumptions are made before the test. Furthermore, every case in [5]
and [6] showed that random testing is less effective than the investigated partition testing
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methods.
Under the constraint of the blindness requirement, the tester should complete the entire
testing process before comparing the testing results and drawing conclusions. However, in
order to fulfill the fairness requirement, a tester using random testing must test all possible
combinations, which has the complexity of O(lk) for testing a system with k parameters
each of which has l values. On the other hand, Cohen et al [15] proved that the complexity of
completely testing the same system by using partition testing can be reduced to O(l×log2 k)
provided that a greedy algorithm always exists.
The performance of a computer system may be influenced by a number of “parameters”,
such as CPU working frequency, choice of memory volume, chip working voltage, settings
of OS and settings of the software tools, etc. Normally, each of these parameters can be
assigned several “values” by the tester; for instance, the CPU working voltage often can be
increased by 0.1v or 0.2v and the memory volume of a system can be enlarged by adding a
new RAM chip. We shall use the term “parameter list” for the set of all pairs (p, v) where
p is a parameter of the system to be considered in testing and v is a value associated with
p. For the purposes of applying partition testing, the system’s input domain will be this
parameter list and each parameter along with its associated values will be considered as a
subdomain.
According to Hamlet and Taylor, partition testing must sample the input domain often
so that a uniform distribution across each subdomain is obtained, because “were the ap-
propriate distribution skewed in any way, it would be a bias” [4]. Essentially, this remark
is a restatement of our fairness requirement in which each value of every parameter of the
system should be tested for an equal number of times.
Later in this section, we will introduce a method of obtaining a set of testing suites
meeting the fairness and blindness requirements.
2.2 Orthogonal Arrays (OAs)
The partition testing strategy can be related to the concept of matrices. Let each param-
eter correspond to a column in a matrix and fill the column entries with the parameter’s
associated values. The question is, how should these values be placed in the columns? Our
aim is to establish a placement in such a way that the resultant rows contain entries which
meet the fairness and blindness requirements and thus establish a suite of tests (one for
each row) which completes our test target. Thus, an effective partition testing suite is con-
structed when the entries of the corresponding matrix have an even distribution, according
to Hamlet and Taylor’s work mentioned in the previous subsection.
The focus now becomes a search for appropriate matrix constructions, resolved by the
use of Orthogonal Arrays. Orthogonal arrays (OAs) are matrices with the following two
properties [17] —
1. Those elements appearing in a column occur the same number of times.
2. If all possible ordered pairs appear across two or more arbitrary columns, then the
ordered pairs of elements in these columns occur the same number of times.
The two properties of an orthogonal array ensure that the fairness condition holds — the
first property suggests an equal chance of appearance of every parameter value; the second
one suggests that all possible values of one parameter appear against their counterparts of
any other parameters. And the blindness requirement is satisfied if all the rows of an OA
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are tested as testing suites before drawing conclusions. Thus, given a set of parameters and
corresponding values for a system, an appropriate testing suite can be found if an orthogonal
array exists with the same number of columns as parameters, and matrix entries correspond
to parameter values.
Two example sets of ordered pairs which are OAs are listed in Figure 1 — the left is
based on values from the set {0, 1} and the right on values from the set {0, 1, 2}. In both
cases, elements appearing in each column are evenly distributed; note that the value 2 does
not appear at all in column 1 of example 2. (This will be useful for our application as it
indicates that the corresponding parameter only has two values.)
0           0
0           1
1           0
1           1
0           0
0           1
0           2
1           0
1           1
1           2
Figure 1. Examples of Ordered Pairs accross 2 Columns
An orthogonal array allows great flexibility. For instance, any column can be exchanged
with another, or even omitted, without violating either of the two properties. Other systems
such as Latin Squares and Mutually Orthogonal Latin Squares (MOLS) [9] also satisfy the
fairness requirement, but they are more rigid to use since the fairness requirement will not
hold if one column is removed.
An additional reason for preferring OAs is a simulation study carried out by Maity and
Nayak [18] demonstrating that the number of test cases using an OA “is never higher and
in some cases lower than using two popular computer-based design generator AETG or
IPO”, where information about AETG and IPO can be found in [15] and [19] respectively.
2.3 Our Testing Methodology
As mentioned in the previous section, we will use OAs in a partition testing approach
for performance testing over a computer system where digital forensic tools are installed.
Our objective is to distinguish which tool performs better by measuring and comparing
the execution time over a given workload. Because many aspects of an underlying system
affect the execution time of a tool, our methodology needs to be able to process tools and
system settings at the same time.
Obviously, it is of little interest to compare the performance of two different tools built
for completely different tasks. To group tools by using precise software engineering concepts
such as “feature” [20] is not viable, unless we possess the tools design specifications. We
therefore focus on the abstraction level inspired by Carrier’s model of abstraction layers.
Carrier [21] proposes the concept of abstraction layers as a means of categorizing digital
forensic tools. He states, “The custom format is a layer of abstraction” and “each abstrac-
tion layer can be described as a function of inputs and outputs.” The inputs are further
split into the input data and a rule set, and the outputs consist of the output data and
Proceedings of the Second International Workshop
on Systematic Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering (SADFE'07)
0-7695-2808-2/07 $20.00  © 2007
Authorized licensed use limited to: DEAKIN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY. Downloaded on May 27, 2009 at 01:27 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
a margin of error (as shown in Figure 2). Therefore, an open-source forensic tool can be
modeled by using a stack of such single layers, which as a whole takes the input data and
produces the output data.
Input Data
Rule Set
Output Data
Margin of Error
Abstraction
Layer
Figure 2. A Single Abstraction Layer [21]
However, one of the key elements in this model, the rule set, (referred to as “design
specifications” in Carrier’s paper) is assumed to be empty in our case, since, as stated earlier,
most design specifications of digital forensic tools are not publicly available. We do assume,
however, that the tool tester knows how to use the tools and uses them correctly during
the testing phase; that the tester has a clear understanding of the formats of inputting and
outputting data for each forensic tool to be tested; and that the tester is capable of tuning
the underlying computer system by replacing hardware components or adjusting system
settings.
We also omit the concept of margin of error because Carrier’s objective was to measure
error resulting from the use of the tool, while this is not associated in any way with our
objective.
We therefore base our choice of tools to be tested, based on Carrier’s results, on the
formats of the input and output data. Consequently, we choose a selection of tools which
perform similar forensic tasks, have identical input data and have identical output data
formats. For example, John The Ripper and OphCrack are used to recover Windows logon
passwords. Both tools have as input a Windows password file and as output as ASCII
string.
Having constructed a parameter list by including all possible values of all identified
parameters, we use the same strategy as described in the Taguchi method [10-12] to relate
the list to an OA — each parameter is represented by a distinct column of the selected
OA; each value of a parameter is randomly linked to a symbol in the corresponding column
which represents that parameter. Then, each testing suite is represented by a row of the
OA. Therefore, the number of rows of the OA becomes the number of testing runs for the
given parameter list.
After the testing phase is completed, we again use the Taguchi method to process the
resulting data and conduct the proper statistical analysis. The Taguchi method is not the
focus of this paper and so a description of it is omitted. The interested reader can find good
examples and full references in [10], an informal approach in [11], and complete theoretical
background and insightful discussions on technical details from [22] and [12].
The testing cost is now directly proportional to the total number of tests, which is the
number of rows of the chosen OA. Hence, the problem of deriving the lower bound of a
testing case is the problem of deriving the number of rows in the OA which represents the
parameter list. In the next section, we will derive the numerical solution for this problem.
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3 The Lower Bound
In this section, we will numerically derive the lower bound of the row size of an OA which
is capable of accommodating a given list of parameters. As we have shown in the previous
section, this lower bound is actually directly proportional to the minimal cost required to
carry out a testing case satisfying our requirements.
3.1 Definitions and Notations
In the following definition, we have replaced the word ‘factor’ by the word ‘parameter’
in order to remain consistent with our terminology.
Definition 3.1 An orthogonal array OA(N, sk11 s
k2
2 . . . s
kv
v , t) is an array of size N×k, where
k = k1 + k2 + · · ·+ kv is the total number of parameters, in which the first k1 columns have
symbols from {0, 1, . . . , s1 − 1}, the next k2 columns have symbols from {0, 1, . . . , s2 − 1},
and so on, with the property that in any N × t subarray every possible t-tuple occurs an
equal number of times as a row. [8] (pp 200)
We list all the notations used in this paper in Table 1. We set t = 2 by following the
observation of Hedayat et al. in [8] (pp 199), which says the best value of t is 2 when not
all si are equal.
Symbol Meaning
N The number of tows of an OA
Nmin The least possible number of rows of an OA, known as the Rao bound.
Nmax The upper bound of N , which guarantees an OA exists of that row size.
Ni A candidate choice for N , which satisfies Nmin ≤ N ≤ Nmax.
si The number of settings of the i-th parameter, also referred to as “levels”
in other literature.
max(si) The maximum of si.
s The maximum of si in an existing OA, which can be greater than max(si).
ki The number of parameters having si settings.
k The sum over ki.
t Strength value indicating the evenly distributed pairs across t columns in
an OA. t = 2 is used when si 6= sj.
{sk11 s
k2
2 . . . s
kv
v } The parameter list accommodating all k parameters with their associated
settings. We remove the curly brackets when it is in an OA expression.
Table 1. Notations
3.2 Existing Research Results
According to the definition of OA, one could identify an OA by its row size N , its
parameter list {sk11 s
k2
2 . . . s
kv
v } and the t value. Given a parameter list and a fixed t value,
we only need to derive an exact minimum value for N to identify an OA.
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Rao in [17] found an inequality relation in which the value of N has to be equal or larger
than an integer Nmin:
N ≥ Nmin = 1 + k1(s1 − 1) + k2(s2 − 1) + · · · + kv(sv − 1)
for a given parameter set {sk11 s
k2
2 . . . s
kv
v }. The Rao inequality is a necessary condition on
N . For example, the Rao inequality for {24} is 4, but an OA(4, 24, 2) does not exist. Dios
and Chopra [23] showed that for some values of N , corresponding OAs do not exist.
Many OAs with small row sizes have been constructed, although the general existence
problem is open. Colbourn and Dinitz [9] (Table 4.19 and Table 4.20, pp 174-176) provide a
list of OAs for various values of N covering up to 50 parameters; Hedayat et al. [8] (section
12) list OAs with up to several thousand rows; Sloane hosts an online library (http:
//www.research.att.com/~njas/oadir/index.html) containing all known OAs with up
to 100 rows.
Remarkably, the following three theorems [8] assure the existence of OAs which can be
constructed algebraically.
Theorem 3.1 For s a prime power, there exists an OA(s2, ss+1, 2). [8] (pp 27)
Theorem 1 guarantees that there is an OA which can accommodate a given parameter
set of any size, because any parameter list {sk11 s
k2
2 . . . s
kv
v } can be contained by a larger list
{ss+1}, as long as we find a prime power s such that s ≥ max(k − 1,max(si)). However,
the parameter list {sk11 s
k2
2 . . . s
kv
v } may be covered by an OA whose row size N is between
Nmin and s
2. Theorems 2 and 3 below give us a finer grain.
Theorem 3.2 If s is an odd prime power, then for any n ≥ 2 there exists an
OA(2sn, s
2(sn−1)
s−1
−1
, 2). [8] (pp 45 Theorem 3.16)
Theorem 3.3 If s is a prime power, then for any n ≥ 2 there exists an OA(sn, s
s
n
−1
s−1 , 2).
[8] (pp 49 Theorem 3.20)
3.3 Deriving the Lower Bound Numerically
Because there is no known algorithm to generate all existing OAs and the complexity of
generation is still unknown [8], we include a library of OAs as a part of the input of our
algorithm. In practice, the best computer OA generator was developed by Xu [24], but it
does not generate all existing OAs. In this paper, we use Sloane’s online library to assist
with the solution because it is sufficient for daily performance testing work — an OA with
100 rows can accommodate up to 99 parameters with binary values.
Our algorithm follows:
Algorithm input: a parameter list {sk11 s
k2
2 . . . s
kv
v } and a library of OAs.
Algorithm output: an integer N which guarantees OA(N, sk11 s
k2
2 . . . s
kv
v , 2) exists.
Begin Algorithm
1) If max(si) is a prime power and max(si) divides any sj 6= si, then let s = max(si) and
go to the next step; otherwise, round max(si) up to the next smallest prime power
greater than max(si) and which divides some si. We denote this prime power as s.
2) Calculate the Rao inequality bound Nmin.
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3) If k < s+ 1, set Nmin = s
2; if s is an odd prime power, calculate the smallest integer
n ≥ logs(k(s−1+1) ≥ 2, and set Nmax = s
n; otherwise, calculate the smallest integer
n ≥ logs
(
k(s−1)
2 + 1
)
≥ 2, and set Nmax = 2s
n.
4) Iterate an integer Ni from Nmin to Nmax, record those dividing s.
5) Go through the OA library to check if there is an OA of Ni-rows that accommodates
the given parameter list. If so, choose N as the least Ni from the list obtained in step
(4); otherwise, set N = Nmax.
End Algorithm
We are now able to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4 The above algorithm guarantees the existence of an OA with the smallest
number of rows covering a given parameter list {sk11 s
k2
2 . . . s
kv
v }.
Proof: From Theorems 2 and 3, an OA(Nmax, s
k, 2) exists. The parameter list {sk}
contains the given parameter list {sk11 s
k2
2 . . . s
kv
v } because s ≥ si and k = k1 + k2 + · · ·+ kv.
In our algorithm, the default value of Ni is Nmax. Because the Rao inequality is a necessary
condition, the actual lower bound N must exist in the exhaustive list of consecutive integers
between Nmin and Nmax. According to the definition of OA, N divides s because each
symbol needs to appear an equal number of times in every column. Therefore, iterating the
list of candidate integers between Nmin and Nmax at s’th step produces the lower bound
of N .
As an example, we now derive the lower bounds for two parameter lists {714125} and
{8126} by following our algorithm. For the list {714125}, max(si) = 7 does not divide
si = 2 nor si = 4. So we round max(si) up to 8, which is a prime power and divides si = 2
and si = 4. So take s = 8, Nmin = 14 and Nmax = 64. Iterating between 14 and 64, we
find OA(32, 8148), so that N = 32. This suggests we need 32 testing cases to complete
testing for {714125} satisfying the fairness and blindness requirements. For the list {8126},
max(si) = 8 divides si = 2. So take s = max(si) = 8, Nmin = 14 and Nmax = 64. Iterating
between 14 and 64, we find OA(16, 8128), so that N = 16. This suggests we need 16 testing
cases to complete testing for {8126} satisfying the fairness and blindness requirements.
A comparison result is listed in Table 2 where several other algorithms have been used
to generate testing suites regarding these two example parameter set, such as IPO [19],
recursive block [25], pair-wise [25] and full combinatorial [9]. The results reveal that the
use of orthogonal arrays is the most efficient approach to generate balanced testing suites.
Parameter OA IPO [19] Recursive Pair-wise Full Combinatorial
list Block [25] [25] [9]
{714125} Balanced Unbalanced Unbalanced Unbalanced Balanced
32-row design 28-row design 40-row design 28-row design 898-row design
{8126} Balanced Balanced Unbalanced Balanced Balanced
16-row design 16-row design 18-row design 16-row design 512-row design
Table 2. Testing Suites Generated by Using Different Schemes
3.4 A Strategy to Further Reduce the Testing Cost
The lower bound of N depends on two bounds Nmin and Nmax because Nmin ≤ N ≤
Nmax. The value of Nmin decreases whenever any parameter or any of their values is
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dropped; the value of Nmax decreases when s divides more other parameters’ values si until
s becomes the least common multiplier of all si.
The tester can remove parameters from the parameter list by asserting that those pa-
rameters and their interaction will definitely have no impact on the performance. Dropping
out many parameters in the performance testing for digital forensic tools is not acceptable,
because one often does not know whether there is interaction between the eliminated pa-
rameter and other parameters. For instance, one cannot claim there is no interplay between
a parameter and a tool when the tool’s design specification is unknown.
Hence, we advocate possibly reducing the number of values from a parameter whose
performance impact is evident. A tester should be able to remove those values of a param-
eter, if they affect the performance in a consistent manner. For example, in general, the
performance of a modern computer system can be boosted by increasing the CPU work-
ing frequency, reducing the memory latency, maintaining good voltage on CPU, memory
and motherboard chips. On the OS level, any inappropriate configurations of system ser-
vices, device drivers, storage systems and runtime libraries may drug down the performance
significantly.
4 Case Study —Performance Testing on Password Cracking Tools
To validate our methodology, we conducted a performance test on password cracking
tools. We searched tools whose input data format is small file containing encrypted infor-
mation and whose output data format is an ASCII string as the encryption key. Seven
well-known and easily accessible tools were therefore selected — LC5, John the Ripper,
OphCrack, Advanced Archive Password Recovery, Advanced Office Password Recovery, Zip
Key and Office Key. These tools can be used to recover the encryption keys (passwords)
from system logon password files, encrypted archive files and encrypted Office document
files.
We installed those tools on a PC with a CPU of AMD Athlon XP 1800+, Hyundai
DDR400 memory chip, a Gigabyte GA-7N400 mother board, dual-boot system of Windows
XP SP2 and Debian 3.0. Some parameters were tuned to study their impact on the system
performance — the CPU working frequency could be adjusted by tuning the frequency of
Front-Side-Bus (FSB) to 100MHz, 133MHz, 166MHz or 200MHz; the RAM volume could
be 512MB or 1GB by plugging two different RAM chips; the latency of the memory chips
could be set to 2 clock cycles or 3 clock cycles; the working voltage of the CPU could be
set to 1.7v or 1.8v; the execution priority of all the tools could be adjusted to the highest
or the lowest level in the OS; all tools could be configured to include or exclude special
symbols other than English alphanumerical ones.
Hence, the parameter list of our system was {714125} — the selection of cracking tool
had 7 values, FSB had 4 values, and the rest had 2 values each. The lower bound for the
parameter list {714125} was calculated as 32 in Section 3.
It was still possible for us to further reduce the testing runs. According to our knowl-
edge of the computer architecture [26], CPU working frequency consistently influences the
system’s performance: the higher the frequency the faster the system. And we asserted
that the interaction between CPU working frequency and other parameters in the list was
negligible. And the CPU working frequency was proportional to the FSB frequency in
our system. Therefore, we reduced the number of values by removing intermediate values
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(133MHz and 166MHz) of the FSB frequency parameter and the FSB frequency became
a binary parameter with values 100MHz and 200MHz while the updated parameter list
became {7126}.
By following our algorithm again, we derived that the updated parameter list {7126}
actually had the same lower bound as the list {8126}, which was 16 as calculated in Section
3. Hence, an orthogonal array OA(16, 8126, 2) was chosen. And, we had an option to add
an additional tool or a new cracking scenario to the chosen OA. We chose to use a new
scenario because John the Ripper could crack multiple types of system password files. The
testing runs were arranged as following — in testing runs 1 and 2, we used LC5 to crack
Windows logon password files; in testing runs 3 and 4, we used John the Ripper to crack
Linux system password files; in testing runs 5 and 6, we used OphCrack to crack Windows
logon password files; in testing runs 7 and 8, we used ArchPR to crack encrypted ZIP
archives; in testing runs 9 and 10, we used John the Ripper to crack SUN Solaris system
password file; in testing runs 11 and 12, we used Zip Key to crack encrypted ZIP archives;
in testing runs 13 and 14, we used Office Key to crack encrypted Word documents; in
testing runs 15 and 16, we used AOPR to crack encrypted Word documents.
Each file had three copies and was encrypted by three different alphanumerical keys
“Russia”, “ifyinn” and “Lyin05”. The average execution time in each testing run is listed
in Figure 3, where the execution time varied drastically from a dozen of seconds to a few
days. (Please refer to Table 3 in Appendix for the complete list of observed execution time
and the setup details.)
Figure 3. Average Execution Time(in 105 seconds) Observed in The 16 Testing Runs
Having processed the experimental data and conducted a statistical analysis in [27] in
accordance with the Taguchi method, we identified the tool choice and the value of in-
cluding/excluding special symbols were the two main causes of the huge difference in the
observed execution time; the statistical analysis also indicated that other parameters only
impacted the performance difference as negligible random noises. The detailed statistical
analysis has been published in [27].
We concluded that the real lower bound in this case study was 16 runs, the same as our
prediction. Given the testing result — the tool selection and the symbol selection affected
the system performance, a tester must perform a complete random testing with at least
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8× 2 = 16 runs to check our result without bias.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we develop a numerical algorithm to derive the lower bound of carrying out
effective performance testing cases for digital forensic tools. Our assumptions are that the
tester uses tools correctly during the testing phase and knows the data formats of inputting
and outputting data. No design knowledge about tools is required.
We also show that the knowledge of the underlying system can be used to further reduce
the testing runs which are proportional to the total testing cost. Our methodology is
supported by the results from a case study of testing password cracking tools.
In addition, we describe the potential of extending this work to conduct correctness
testing cases on digital forensic tools. But there are two obstacles to conquer:
1. The unavailability of design specifications of many forensic tools prevents the tester
from determining what is to be tested. As argued by Carrier [28], the release of
design specifications will help the tester understand better how the tool should work
and thereafter develop more effective and more specific testing suites. A tool tester
should be able to identify the testing cost by following our algorithm if a design
specification helped him/her realize which parts of the tool are to be tested.
2. Without an effective metric to measure the correctness of tools, comparative testing
is not a viable approach. The large amount of information generated by correctness
testing has to be quantified before the comparison becomes possible.
Ideally, the design specification of a forensic tool should describe exactly how the tool
should behave and how it should not. The unavailability of the vendor’s specification can be
partially overcame by using some generic tool specifications, such as for disk imaging tools
[29] and for write blocking tools [30]. However, such generic specifications may be incom-
plete or excessively redundant — an incomplete specification will make the tester neglect
to test some important tool functionalities and a redundant specification will unnecessarily
incur too many testing cases. The generic specifications can be published, discussed, revised
and later standardized through peer-reviewing. If vendors decide to use such standardized
specifications for developing forensic tools, then the tool tester can develop a uniform set of
testing data and a methodology for testing those tools. Consequently, a reliable and trust-
worthy conclusion can be drawn by referring to independent testing reports from different
parties.
In order to develop an effective and efficient testing scheme, an accurate and precise
measurement metric is also necessary. The accuracy and precision of the metric affects the
quality of testing results. In performance testing, an accurate and precise clock should be
used to measure the execution time — we used a tested stopwatch with the precision of 0.5
seconds for testing password cracking tools in the case study. In correctness testing, it is
very difficult to find a comparable measurement tool.
Appendix
The testing procedure in this section has been published in [27]. Our experiment con-
sisted of 16 testing rounds, each of which complied with the value in the corresponding row
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in Table 3 below. The values for the software tools are mentioned in Section 4.
Ru Soft FSB RAM Late Vol Prio Speical Unused Execution time (sec)
ns ware Size ncy tage rity symbol columns T1 T2 T3
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 261 576
2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3934 8974
3 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 10 383850 187637
4 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 27793 94418
5 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 182 190 3
6 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 92 97 4
7 3 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 20645 40477 13608
8 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1353 2626 894
9 4 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 12514 6474
10 4 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 6268 3039
11 5 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 43 61 5467
12 5 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 30 60 22634
13 6 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 23 1216932
14 6 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 6 19 61565
15 7 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 11 115152 39516
16 7 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 6 513828 157788
Table 3. Testing Rounds and Results of the Case Study
The remaining columns were arranged as follows — FSB frequency was set to 100MHz
or 200MHz denoted as treatment “0” and “1” respectively; RAM size was either 512MB
or 1GB denoted as treatment “0” or “1”; memory latency was set to 2 clock cycles or
3 clock cycles denoted as treatment “0” or “1”; voltage was set to 1.7v or 1.8v denoted
as treatment “0” or “1”; priority was either the lowest or the highest allocated by the
operating system denoted as treatment “0” or “1”; character set included either special
symbols or not denoted as treatment “0” or “1”. Two columns in the original OA were not
used because all the parameters of interest have been arranged. Three passwords “Russia”,
“ifyinn”, and “Lyin05” were used and their execution time (in seconds) was recorded in
column T1, T2, and T3, respectively.
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